Michigan Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 1

1917

Recent Important Decisions
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Recent Important Decisions, 16 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1917).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/5

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
A'r'I'ORNEYs-DrsoBEDIENCF; OF ORDER oF SusPF;NSlON-WHA'I.' Acrs CoNs'l.'1'l.'U'l.'S.-Defendants had been su~pended from practice "in all the courts of
this state" for one y~r. During suspension they had continued to maintain
a law office with the usual signs on the doors and windows, used envelopes
and stationery with their names printed thereon as Attorneys at Law, and
permitted their names to be inserted as attorneys at law in telephone and
city directories. Defendant M had caused the preparation of a complaint,
affidavit, and bond in attachment under his direction and had them fil~d in
a suit in the District Court by one K, a licensed attorney, and had represented A, administrator of an estate, before the Probate Court. Defendant
W drew up a mortgage, charged a fee therefor, examined abstracts of title,
passed upon them, and appeared at a hearing before the State Engineers,
there examining witnesses and interposing objections to ·avidence. Held,
that these acts constituted contempt of court; that the act of M in appearing
before the Probate Court alone constituted a contempt of court. State v.
Marro1i; Same v. Wood (N. Mex. 1917), 167 Pac. 9.
The cases of fa re Duncan (1909), 83 S. C. 186, 18 Ann. Cas. 657, 65 S. E.
210, ·24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750; State v. Richardson, (1910), 125 La. 644, 51 So.
673; and fa re Lizotte (19u), 32 R. I. 386, 79 Atl. 96o, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.)
794, seem to be the only other reported cases which have been decided on
this qu~stion. They are all in accord with the principal case. In State v.
Richardso11, supra, and 'l1i re Lizotte, supra, the acts held to constitute contempt were almost identical with those in the principal case. The main defense in these cases have been that the effect of an order of suspension was
only to deprive an attorney of such rights and powers as the court had
conferred upon him; that since a layman could have done the acts alleged
the defendant has not violated the order of the court. There are several
dicta which seems to support this argument. See State v. Swan (1899), 6o
Kans, 461, 56 Pac. 750; Danforth v. Egan (1909), 23 S. Dak. 43, n9 N. W.
1021, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418. See also the vigorous dissent
in the principal case. The courts, however, in the above cases have met this
argument by saying that in holding himself out as an attorney at law the
defendant was holding himself out as an officer of tha court, which the
court's order of suspension had expressly declared he no longer was. In
the principal case M was held guilty of .contempt of court in appearing before the probate court under a statute construed to give the court power
to extend its order to include practice before these inferior courts. Th~ point
is expressly decided without reference to a statute in In re Duncan, supra.
The fact that his act is appearance in an inferior court instead of advising
clients in an office as an attorney would seem not to justify a distinction,
since in both cases the defendant has acted not as a layman but as an officer
of the court. Since the defendant's contempt· of court consists in holding
himself out as an attorney at law the cases seem to involve the same prin-
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ciple as in such cases as fo 1·e Bailey (1915), 50 Mont. 365, 146 Pac. 1101,
Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 11g8, in which an unlicensed person was held guilty of
contempt of court in holding himself out as an attorney at law.
BANKRUPTCY-PREFiiRENCE-M:eANING OF "INSOLV!;NT."-In an action in a
state court by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover for the estate a preferential
transfer, the court refused an instruction requested by plaintiff that if defendant "was not able to pay its debts in due course of business it would be
deemed insolvent." Held, error to refuse such instruction. Simpson v.
Western Hardware & Metal Co. (Wash. 1917), 167 Pac. 113.
Section I, Cl. 15, of the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r provides that "A person shall
be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this act whenever the aggregate
of his property * * * shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to
pay his debts." Section 6oa provides that "A person shall be deemed to have
given a preference if, being insolvent, he has, * * * made a transfer," etc:
Under Sec. 6ob such preferential transfers may, under certain conditions, be
recovered back by the trustee, by action in a federal or state court. It was
in such a proceeding that the court in the principal case held the meaning
of "insolvent" should be determined according to state law rather than by the
BANKRUPTCY Ac:r. No authority is cited, and probably none could be found
supporting such vfaw. In view of the fact that the whole proceeding was
based on the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r, the trustee deriving all of his powers therefrom, and preferential payments being recoverable by him solely because of
the Act, it would seem almost too clear for argument that the lower court
was right. In Cra11cer & Co. v. Wade, 26 Oki. 757, 25 Am. Bankr. R. 88o,
where the action was the same as in the principal case the court said that
the definition of "insolvency" as fixed by the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r "must be
strictly adhered to." And in Smnmerdlle v. Stockton Milling Co., 142 Cal. 529,
where the question was whether a mortgage was an unlawful preference
under the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r, the court applied the definition of insolvency
therein, although the other meaning had been adopted in earlier cases not
involving the Ac:r of 18g8. fo re Ramazzina, uo Cal. 488. Section 3a(4)
declares an act of bankruptcy to have been committed if "because of insolvency a receiver or trustee has been put in charge of his property under
th-a laws of a state * * * " There would seem to be much more excuse
for following the rule of the state court as to what amounts to insolvency
in cases arising under this provision than in cases' like the principal case. It
has been generally considered, however, that the definition in the Ac:r is to
control such cases. Maplecroft Mills v. Childs, 226 Fed. 415. See comment
in 14 MICH. L. Rm. 338.
CARR!1'RS-!NT1'RSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-SCOPE OF ORDER R!lGULATING INTRASTATE RATES.-An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
directed certain express companies to remove an existing, discrimination
against interstate commerce by ceasing to charge higher rates between Sioux
City, Iowa, and South Dakota points than for substantially equal distances
between such South Dakota points and five named South Dakota cities. The
order undertook to give to the carriers a discretion as to the method to be
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employed and as to the territory to which it should apply, but intimated
that the desired result might best be obtained by raising intrastate rates.
The express companies, disregarding the ord~rs and regulations of the State
Board of Railroad Commissioners, raised their intrastate rates between the
five named South Dakota cities and points in every part of the state. Held,
the Commission's order can serve as a justification for disregarding a regulation issued under state authority only to the extent n~cessary to remove discrimination in definite competitive territory. American Express Co. et al v.
State of South Dakota (1917), 37 Sup. Ct. 056.
In reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, reported
in P. U. R. l917C, 471, 161 N. W. 132, Justice BRANDEIS briefly reaffirms the
power of Congress to control intrastate charges of an interstate carrier
to the extent necessary to prevent injurious discrimination against interstate
commerce, the doctrine laid down in the 1\limiesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.
352, 57 L. Ed. l5II, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1~51; and also reaffirms the intention of Congress to delegate this power to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the INTERSTATE CoMMtRCS Ar:r, 24 Stat. 379, c. 104, U. S. Comp. St
1901, p. 3154, and 'the amendments thereto, the question decided in the Shreveport case, Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct.
833, 58 L. Ed. 1341. Although these two decisions have been subjected to considerable adverse criticism as departures from authoritative precedents, for a
•scholarly treatment of which, see 28 HARVARD LAW RsVIEW, p. 34, the court in
the instant case holds the doctrines of those cases as established beyond controversy. The same position is upheld in St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. et al.
v. State (Ark.), 197 S. W. 1. But another, and perhaps more important question, was raised for decision in the instant case by the action of the carriers
in raising their rates from the five specified cities to points in all parts of
the state, contrary to the orders of the state board. In the Shreveport case,
supra, the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 23 I. C. C. 231,
was definite as to the points to which the rates were to be changed; but in
the present case the order it~lf, 39 I. C. C. 703, specified neither the territory to be affected nor the rates to be put into effect. The court holds,
that in a case like the present where_ Federal and state authorities conflict,
the order must definitely define and limit the territory in which the discrimination is found to exist, for it is only within that sphere that the power of the
Federal Commission dominates state regulation. The court here finds the
order sufficiently definite when read in conjunction with the report annexed
thereto, and that the order of the commission did not apply to rate advances
other than those in competitive territory in the southeast-em part of South
Dakota. The question of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to authorize the raising of all intrastate rates contrary to state regulations,
and not merely those in competitive territory, is now being argued by certain Illinois ~ilroads before the Commission.
CoNs'tI'rU'tloNAL LAw-CoNsCRIPT.IoN Act oF MAY 18, 1917, VAI,m1n oF.Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to commit an offense against the
United States in unlawfully and wilfully aiding, abetting,- and procuring per-
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sons to violate the CONSCRIPTION Ac:r. He filed a motion to quash. Held,
motion should be denied. U.S. v. Sugar, et al. (Dist. Ct. 1917), 243 Fed. 423.
!n the ·principal case defendant attacked the constitutionality of the CoNSCRIPTION Ac:r, but the court held the act not unconstitutional, because: (I)
It is not contrary to the provision of the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT prohibiting
involuntary servitude. See fo re Dassler, 35 Kans. 678. (2) Even though it
may constitute class legislation, there is no provision in the FEDERAI. CONSTITUTION prohibiting Congress from passing laws of that character, the inhibition of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT is directed against state legislation
only. See U.S. v. Adair, 152 Fed. 737; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S.
107. (3) It does not infringe upon the power of review lodged in the courts
because the power given to the boards to pass upon exemption claims has its
source in the CONSTITUTION, in the fourteenth subdivision of Sec. 8, Art. l.
See E% Parte Dickey, 204 Fed. 322; The Grapeshot, 76 U. S. 129. (4) The
act is an exercise of power conferred upon Congress by the FEDERAI. CONSTITUTION. A national government may preserve its existence by war and it
is unnecessary to rely on implication, for the CONSTITUTION expressly provides that Congress shall have power to declare war-to raise armies and
provide a navy and to make rules regulating same. The power to conscript
results from these combined expressed powers. Fairbank v. U. S., 181 U. S.
283; Allen v. Colb::,•, 47 N. H. 544;; Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238. (5) The
Ac:r does not call out the militia for a purpose not authorized by the FEDER.Ar, CONSTITUTION, and even if it did, it could only be questioned by a member of the National Guard. Many cases of similar nature arose during the
Civil War in the Confederacy, •whose Constitution relating to the military
power had been adopted without change from the CONSTITUTION of the United
States, and without an exception the provisions were held constitutional.
E% Parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429; E% Parte Bolling, 39 Ala. 6og; Tarble's Case, 13
Wallace 397; Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347. The power of coercing the citizen
to render military service is not inconsistent with liberty but is essential to
its preservation. Burroughs v. Peyto1i, 57 Va. 470. In E% Parte Coupland,
26 Texas 387, Mr. Justice BEI.r. dissented as to the constitutionality of the
CONSCRIPT LAW for th~ reason that the power is· not expressly given in the
Constitution and because it was not resorted to in the Revolutionary War,
the War of 1812, nor in the War with Mexico. The answer is that it was
not needed then, and if the question had arisen, there is good reason for believing that it would have been held constitutional in view of the theories
expressed by the foremost statesmen of the times. See M'Culloch ·v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 3I6; THE FEDERALIST (9o-g8); President MONROE, Vol. 7NaES REGISTER, 137, 294, 2 Ed. 281. In a recent ca"se, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II, 1905, th~ court said: "The liberty secured by the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT consists in the right of a person 'to live and work
where he will.' Allgeyer v. Lo11isiana, 165 U. S. 578; and he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal
wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country."
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Co~v1ms10N-Eu:crR1CITY-WArvER OF ToRT.-P occupied an upper floor
in a building, the basement of which was occupied by D. Whether one was
tenant to the other, or they were tenants of a common landlord, or otherwise, does not appear. In the basement was a large electric light which for
several years drew current through a meter on P's premises, for which, presumably, P paid the producer of the electricity. Apparently neither party
k"llew of the connection of the lamp with ihe meter during any of the period
in question. P now sues D for the value of the electricity thus consumed at
his expense. The pleadings are not set forth but we are told that P's counsel
"properly characterized the action 'as a suit upon an implied contract." Held,
that a demurrer to the petition was properly sustained. Kirkpatrick Co. v.
Hamlet, (Ct of App. of Ga. 1917), 93 S. E. 226.
The court says, "The present action is a suit upon an implied contract
for the value of personal property wrongfully taken and converted to the use
of the defendant. * * * "Where one wrongfully takes the personal property
of another and converts the same to his own use in some other manner than
by a sale and does not receive any money therefor, the owner * * * cannot
waive the tort and sue upon an implied contract."
The cases cited by the court are all cases where defendant was clearly
guilty of a conversion, upon the plaintiff's theory of the facts. '\Then we
are asked to pass from this class of cases to others where there is no tort,
we should pause to make some important observations. First, given a tort
remedy, it is not a matter of great importance whether we give or refuse
a concurrent remedy of a quasi-contractual nature, whereas, if there is no
tort remedy, the question as to the quasi-contractual remedy is vital. Secondly, the only reason given for these rulings is the ancient objection to
concurrent remedies, appearing in the earliest of the Georgia cases in these
words, "Unless trover be required in such a case as this, there can be none
in which it ought to be required. We are not prepared to say that there
are not some cases in which the law requires trover." (Spencer v. Hewett,
20 Ga:¢). In that case, the court distinguished one of the authorities cited
for the plaintiff by saying, "in that case the facts were such that unless an
action ex contractu would lie, none would lie." It thus appears that the
principal case is a decision, not, as might at first appear, mere dictum, that
D was guilty of a tort. And, if any tort was committed, it would seem to
have been, as suggested by the court, a conversion. This is, of course, a
somewhat novel conversiqn. Electricity is not, so the physicists tell us, matter, but force; which means that the case is from the physical point of view
more nearly analogous to making one's neighbor work for him under the
point of a gun, than to taking or detaining his goods. But, to any such
objection, it would seem to be a sufficient answer that for all the practical
purposes with which the iaw is concerned, electricity is like liquids and
gases in vessels and pipes ; that in all its commercial aspects it is goods. And,
if authority is demanded, we find an equal extension of the original conception of conversion in the cases holding that shares of stock, as distinguished
from certificates of stock, are the subject of conversion. Payne v. Elliot,
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54 Cal. 339; Ralston v. Ba1ik of California, 112 Cal. 208; Daggett v. Davis,
53 Mich. 35; Budd v. Multnomah Co., I2 Ore 27I; Rio Gra11de Co. v. Bums,
Walker & Co., 82 Tex. 50.
CoRPORA11:0NS-CARS lli>QUIRED OF CORFORATS DIRSCTORS.-A director of
a Building and Loan Association, recommended a loan on property already
incumbered by a mortgage under his control in his personal capacity. He
made no inquiry in regard to the property and was ignorant that it was the
same property which was incumbered. An article of the Association stated
that "No money shall be loaned on property already incumbered." There
was no charge, nor proof of fraud, embezzlement, or wilful misconduct nor
breach of trust for the beenfit of the director, nor a mistake of judgment but
mere inattention and negligence which made possible fraud perpetrated by
another officer of the Association. Held, that the director was guilty of such
negligence as renders him liable for the loss which was occasioned to the
Association by the reason of his failure to act. Four Corners Building &
Lomi Association of Newark v. Schwarzwaelder (N. J. Chancery, I9I7),
IOI Atl. 564.
This case broadens the scope "of the existing law in New Jersey which
has been e>..-pressed in the cases of Williams v. McKay, 46 N. J. Eq. 25 and in
Gerhard v. Welsh, 8o N. J. Eq. 203; that the duty of bringing to their office
(that of a· director), ordinary skill and vigilance was none the less exacting
though they were unpaid servants. They became engaged to carry on the
business of the corporation in the same way that men of common prudence
and skill conduct a similar business for themselves. Honesty of intention
will not excuse imprudence or indifference. The instant case goes further
and holds that apart from any wilful act, a director is held responsible when
he performs an act which under all the circumstances he is bound not to
perform or that he does not perform an act which under all the circumstances he is bound to perform. The United States Supreme Court has given
great lee-way to the directors and has held that they are liable only for
fraud or for such gross negligence as amounts to fraud. Briggs v. Spaulding,
I4I U. S. I32. Pennsylvania courts have gone further, and have held that
where the directors have not sought to make any personal profit there is a
strong presumption negativing negligence. They are likened unto a gratuitous bailee who is liable only for failure to exercise a slight degree of
care. Swentzel v. Penn. Bank, I47 Pa. St. 140. The principal case expresses
the best line of authority and states the rule to be that such officers must
exercise ordinary care, i. e., that care which every man of common prudence
and discretion takes of his own concerns. This decision is of great interest
to the investor and will act as a stimulus to the market. Cf. Ba1ik v. Hill,
5~ Me. 385; Marshall v. Bank, 85 Va. 676; Warren v. Robison, I9 Ut. 289.
CORPORATIONS-MAJORITY OF STOCKHOLDERS ALISN ENJ~MISS LIVING IN
ENEMY COUNTRY-RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO Sm:.-In an action by the plaintiff, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey, with
94% of its capital stock owned by a German corporation and a German citizen
resident in Germany, defendant filed a motion to stay the plaintiff from fur-
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ther prosecuting the action, until the determination of the present war between Germany and the United States, on the ground that the plaintiff was
an alien enemy. Held, that the motion should be denied because the corporate body is a distinct entity from the alien owners of its stock, and consequently, though of foreign ownership, it is not to be precluded from access
to our courts during the period of the war. Fritz Schulz, Jr. Co. v. Raimes
& Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 567.
It has become a settled doctrine of corporation law that a corporation,
for the purposes for which it may be considered a citizen, resident, or inhabitant (and one of those purposes is to sue and be sued in the courts) is a
citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the country or state by or under whose
laws it was created or organized, and it can make no difference whatever,
in the application of this doctrine, that the members ·or stockholders are citizens and residents of some other country or state than that to whose laws
the corporation owes its existence. See: Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letsoii, 2
How. 497; Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. 314; St. Louis & San
Francisco Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545; Queen v. Arnaud, 16 Law J. Q. B.
50. The court, in the principal case, in reaching the decision that it did,
merely confirmed the established doctrine of the law that a corporation is
an entity separate and apart from its corporators, and its domicile is as a
matter of law within the state of its creation, and the domicile or character
of its corporators does not affect the domicile or character of the corporation. The result reached by the New York Supreme Court is, however, in
conflict with the result reached by the English House of Lords in the case
of Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., (1916), 2 A. C. 307,
where it was held, on facts practically identical with those in the principal
case, that the corporation would be denied the right to appeal to the courts,
overruling the decision of the Court of Appeal (1915), (1 K. B. 893) and
reaching a conclusion different from that reached in the case of Amorduct
Mfg. Co. v. Defries & Co., 31 T. L. R 69, which decisions are in accord
with the finding and reasoning in the instant case. But it does not follow
that the result of the decision of the House of Lords is to overthrow what
has been stated as an established" doctrine. That decision is not based on
any argument that that doctrine is unsound, but it is based upon the fact
that the Lords were convinced that the Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. was
in fact adhering to, taking instructions from, or acting under the control of,
enemies in the enemy country, so as to impose an enemy character on the
company itself, and thus prevent it from appealing to the courts. In the
principal case, the court came to the conclusion that the Fritz Schulz Co.
was in the control of residents of this country, and therefore did not feel constrained to impose an enemy character upon it, and deprive it of its right to
appeal to the courts. See also Speidel v. Barstow Co., 243 Fed. 621. It may
be pertinent to observe that the city of New York has never been bombed by
Zeppelins.
Covr;NANTS-:Rl>STRICT10Ns-Uss FOR :Rl>SIDSNct PURPosss ONLY.-Covenant restricting the use of premises "for residence purposes only." Held,
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not violated by occupancy of residence property by twelve or fifteen members
of a Catholic Sisterhood who held religious services daily with the assistance
of a priest in a small private chapel fitted with an altar. Hunter Tract Improvement Co. et al. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Nisqually, et al.,
(Wash., 1917), 167 Pac. 100.
The court said that the name given to the house itself was immaterial as
the restriction is not against names but purposes. Smith v. Water Works Co.,
I04 Ala. 315. Scott Co. et al. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop for Diocese of
Oregon. 83 -Oregon 97, 163 Pac. 88, held in accord with the principal case
that a building occupied by nuns might be fairly termed a residence or dwelling, and if the other conditions are complied with, it makes no difference
how large the dwelling is or how many people occupy it. The word residence
is equivalent to residential and is used in contradistinction to business. Hunt
v. Held, 90 Ohio St. 280, Am. Ann. Cas. 1916 C, rn51. Generally a covenant
that property shall be used "for residence purposes only" is held not to prohibit its use as an apartment house or flat. McMurtry v. Phillips Investment
Co., 103 Ky. 3o8, 40 L. R. A. 489; Tillotson v. Gregory, 151 Mich., 128, u4
N. W. 1025; Re Robertson & Defoe, 25 Ont. L. Rep. 286, 30 Ont. W. N. 31.
In McMiirtry v. Phillips, supra, a covenant to use property for residence purposes only was not violated by erection of an apartment house for several
families separate from each other in a general way but with a large dining
room in the basement to be used in common by all tenants when they so
desired,' a common laundry room, and a common store room. But in Burton
v. Stapeley, 4 Ohio N. P. N. S. 65, the court interpreted residence to mean
private dwelling. The judgment of the court was affirmed in 74 Oh. St. 461,
78 N. E. u20. This however is contrary to the generally accepted view and
was disapproved by the Ohio Supreme Court later in Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio
St. 28o, Am. Ann. Cas. 1916 C, rn51.
DEATH-ACTION U~rn!lll- SPRVIV4 ACT-NEGLIGENCE oF BENEFICIARY AS A
DEFENSE-NEGLIGENCE OF BENEFICIARy's HUSBAND AS A DEFENSE.-Deceased's
father obtained employment for him with defendant by fraudulently misrepresenting his age as seventeen instead of sixteen. The father, as personal
representative, seeks to recover for himself and wife under the federal
RAILROAD EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT of April 22, 1go8 and its amendment of
April 5, 1910 on the death of his son caused by injuries sustained while in
defendant's employ. Held, that the negligence of the father prevented recovery for either parent. Crevelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Wash.
1917), 167 Pac. 66..
The negligel).t beneficiary is easily seen beneath the thin disguise of the
personal representative required by the statute to sue, Penny v. New Orleans,
etc., R. Co. (I914), 135 La. g621 66 So. 313; and the rule in regard to contributory negligence gives the result reached without more reasoning. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, 2d Ed., Sec. 7I; J. H. W1GMORE, 2 Ill. L.
Rev. 487. A distinction, however, was made between the statutes giving the
benefit of the recovery to the deceased's estate, Love v. Detroit, etc. Ry. Co.,
170 Mich. 1, 135 N. W. g63, and those naming beneficiaries. This distinction
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leads to the same result, inasmuch as the act has been uniformly construed as
creating a new right of action for the beneficiaries. American R. R. v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. r45, r49; Wellman v. Bethea (1917), 243 Fed. 222, 225. Even
defeating the wife's recovery has some justification on account of Washington statutes which would make it impossible for the court to keep the husband from sharing it. This fact answers the strongest arguments against
Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co. (19r5), 248 Pa. St. 503, 94 At!. 269, L. R. A.
1915 E. 781. But there is an admitted conflict. 29 HARV. L. REv. 99; 25 YALE
I,. J. 244; 15 CoL. L. RI<:v. 629.
EvIDENc:E-Vn:w IN A FOREIGN STATE.-Libel for divorce on the ground
of adultery. A general statute authorized the court, in its discretion, to order
a view. The judge, without exception of either party, ordered a view in
!lfassachusetts of premises where the acts of adultery were alleged to have
been committed. The judge took the view in the presence of both parties.
Held, that it was not error to order a view in a foreign state. Carpenter v.
Carpenter (N. H. I917), IOI At!. 628.
Only one other case has been found in which the question of the propriety
of a view outside of the state was raised. In this case, State v. Hawthorn,
134 La. 979, 64 So. 873, the court held that it was not error to refuse a view
in a foreign state, on the ground that such a view would be beyond the j urisdiction of the court. The instant case held that no question of jurisdiction
was involved but only one of procedure. A resort to analogy seems to sustain the court. Statutes in many states provide personal service of process
may be made on a person in a foreign state, in some cases through the sheriff
of the court issuing the writ; in others, through the sheriff of the county
where the service is made. NEBR. CODE, Section 81; KANS. CoDE, Section 76.
This service is effective only when the proceeding is iii rem. It is not employed to give the court jurisdiction. That the court has because the res
is before it. The service is nothing but a procedural step to apprise the defendant of the proceedings in the other state as a suitable foundation for a
judgment against property already within the jurisdiction of the court. Peniioyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. Similarly, the view is solely a procedural act to
facilitate proceedings over which the court has already obtained jurisdiction.
Another analogy is found in the case of statutes which provide for the appointment of commissioners in foreign states who are authorized to take
depositions. These are given the same effect as though taken within the
state. This again is an act of procedure without the state which is an aid
to the legal proceedings within the state.
GIFTS-CAUSA l\foRTIS-CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY OF AUTOMOBILE.-Deceased, on his deathbed, maqe the following statement to his fiancee who had ministered to his wants during his illness, "I give you my automobile, May."
The lady took charge and had possession of the machine for several days
thereafter until it was seized by the administrator of the deceased's estate.
Held, the subsequent acceptance and taking of dominion by the donee was
sufficient to satisfy the rule of law requiring delivery to sustain a gift cdusa
mortis. Mackenzie v. Steeves (Wash. 19I7), 167 Pac. 50.
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The necessity for a delivery in cases of gifts mortis causa has been productive of much trouble for the courts. The ease with which such gifts, unlimited in amount, may be established, has caused the courts to look upon
them with disfavor, and has resulted in many of them adhering to the rule
laid down in the early case of Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, requiring actual
delivery of the thing itself, if capable of delivery, and some symbolical act
equivalent to such delivery in case the subject of the gift was incapable of
manual tradition. Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 17 At!. 63, 3 L. R A. 230;
Keepers v. Fidelity Title, etc. Co., 56 N. J. Law 302, 28 At!. 585, 23 L. R A.
184; Apaclzc State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okla. 121, 121 Pac. 237, Ann. Cas.
1914.A, 520. As the court in Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, puts it, "It is
far better that occasionally a gift of this kind should fail than that the rules
of law be so relaxed as to encourage fraud and perjury." Other courts,
acting ori the principle that the law favors the disposition of property by
the owner before death, hold that the donor's intention, when clearly ascertained, is not to be thwarted by a narrow and illiberal construction of what
may have been intended for and deemed by him sufficient delivery. Ellis v.
Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178; Teague v. Abbot, 51 Ind. App. 604,
100 N. E. 27; Waite v. Grnbbe, 43 Ore. 4o6, 73 Pac. 2o6, 99 Am. St. Rep.
~64
Most of the cases along this line, however, contain some element of
symbolical delivery, as the handing over of a key, or, as in Teague v. Abbot,
the delivery of the combination of a safe, and are not precisely in point as
far as the instant case is concerned. In iVaite v. Grnbbe, supra, on which
the court in the present case relies considerably, a gift causa mortis of buried
money by the donor to his daughter was sustained by her acceptance at the
time her father showed her the location of the money, and her acquisition
after her father's death, the intent of the donor answering for the act of
delivery. An examination of the cases cited' in support of that holding reveals only one, or two at the most, in which the court was called upon to
decide that the donor's intent plus acceptance and possession by the donee
would dispense with the act of delivery. In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 55 Vt 325,
the donor announced in the presence of his family that he gave his carriage
to his daughter. She subsequently took possession and used the vehicle, and
this was held sufficient to sustain the gift That case was not, however, a case
of a gift causa mortis, but one inter vivos. It rather looks as though the
courts have gone to unwarranted lengths in seeking to carry out the donor's
intentions.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND.-Plaintiff leased a creamery to X, who covenanted that he would operate the same
as an "independent" creamery. X assigned the term fo defendant who operated the creamery in combination with others, and plaintiff sued for damages.
Held, that the covenant ran with the land and bound defendant. First Nat'l
Bank v. Klock Produce Co. (Ore. 1917), 166 Pac. 955.
The decision in this case is in accord with the authorities, which hold
that, there being the requisite privity of estate, a covenant in a lease that
restricts or abridges some of the rights, privileges, or powers of the cove-

50

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

nantor as owner of the estate, will bind his assignee. It is wholly unnecessary to inquire in the case whether or not the motive of the lessor in inserting in the lease this covenant was personal and independent of his ownership of the reversionary estate, inasmuch as the question here is not whether
the benefit would have run had he assigned the ·reversion. According to
what seems to be the better rule, a covenant will run with the land if it is
an inseparable limitation on that land; and if the lessor chooses to part with
the land subject only to a restriction as to its use, his motive in creating that
restriction sliould make no difference in an action against the assignee of the
covenantor. 12 MICH. L. R.£v. 639. In the English cases where the lessee
of a "tied house,'' covenants to buy his beers and ales only of his lessor, it
has been held that such covenant binds the assignee of the lessee. Clegg v.
Hands, 44 Ch. D. 503; White v. Soiithend Hotel Co. (I8g7), I Ch. 767. A
covenant of this nature affects the estate,....:....Or in the formula of SpenceYs
Case, "touches or concerns the thing demised"--only in the method o'f operating the business. In this respect such a covenant is similar to that of the
principal case. In Congleton v. Pattison, IO East I30, where the lessee of a
mill covenanted to employ only such persons as could give the lessor a certificate of settle!Jlent, it was held that such a covenant did not run with the
land. The logic of this case has been questioned by respectable authority,
it being contended that "a covenant not to employ a particular class of laborers·
is a limitation upon the privileges of the lessee, as such, just as much as a
covenant not to make or sell a particular article." I2 MICH. L. REv. 639,
quoted supra. A covenant in a lease of a paper mill that the lessee would not
make a certain kind of paper which the lessee was engaged in manufacturing
elsewhere was held to bind the asignee of the lessee. American Strawboard
Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 6I9 (I897); and a covenant by a lessee
that if he sold liquor on the premises the business should be conducted
strictly according to law was similarly passed upon. Crowe v. Riley, 63 Oh.
St. l. In the instant case when the lessee acquired the premises he acquired
certain rights and privileges, one of which, had he not covenanted as he did,
being the right to run the business independently or in combination. But
he accepted the premises restricted by a covenant limiting this right, and
such covenant was'properly held to run with the land.
LANDLORD AND TuNANT-IMPLIED COVENANT OF FrTNJ>SS OF TuNANT.-Ac-

tion for breach of warranty, for fraudulent representation and concealment.
Defendant engaged furnislied rooms of the plaintiff for herself and her·
father, who was then afflicted with leprosy. Three months later the defendant's father died. As a result of the occupation the rooms were infected
with leprosy to the plaintiff's damage. At the time defendant engaged the
rooms, she had no knowledge that her father suffered with the disease. Held,
PJaintiff could not recover. Humphreys v. Miller (I917), 2 K. B. 122.
The plaintiff, in the instant case, contended that there is an implied covenant that the tenant is a fit and proper person, and free from infectious disease. The court, without giving any reasons, flatly refused to recognize this
contention. There seems to be no decision by any court of last resort that
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there is such a covenant. The rule is well settled, both in this country and in
England, that, in the absence of fraud and concealment, a lease of unfurnished premises raises no implied covenant by the landlord that they are
tenantable and fit for immediate occupation. Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W.
68. A lease of furnished premises raises such an implied covenant according
to the English cases. Smith v. Marrable, I I M. & W. 5; Wilson v. FinchHatton, 46 L. J. Ex. 489, 2 Ex. D. 336, while in this country there is a split
of authorities. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N. E. 286; Davis v.
George, 67 N. H. 393, 39 Atl. 979. The reason for the distinction is, that
in the case of the furnished premises it is generally understood that the tenant intends immediate occupation of premises, ready for use, whereas-in the
other case the tenant does not intend occupation until he has examined the
premises and made them tenantable according to his own desires. UNDERHILL, L. AND T., § 478. It would seem that the infection of the premises, at
the commencement of the tenancy, by a disease dangerous to an occupant
would constitute a breach of the implied covenant that they are tenantable.
In many instances, it would be just as difficult for the landlord to discover
that the tenant has the infectious disease, as for the tenant to discover the
infection of the premises. There would seem, then, to be some reason for
implying such a covenant on the part of the lessee. Where the element of
knowledge, false representation and concealment enters, the situation is
clearer. The landlord is held liable if he has knowledge of the infection of
the premises and fails to reveal the fact. UNDSRHILI., L. AND T., § 482.
If the converse is the situation, that is, if the tenant has knowledge of his
infectious disease and is guilty of fraudulent concealment or false representation, he too should be held liable. While no court of last resort has expressly so held, Gwymie v. Clarke, decided recently in the Monaghan County
Court (Ireland), referred to in 58 Ohio Law Bulletin, 246, adopts this view,
as does also, by inference, the court in the case of Farrar v. Peterson & Co.,
72 Wash. 482, 130 Pac. 753.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WRONGFUL DISCHARGr:-DoCTRIN:e OF "CoNS'tRUCTIVr: SttVIcr:."-Defendant employed plaintiff for a term of one year at an
agreed salary. Shortly after plaintiff had entered upon the performance of
the services under the contract, defendant wrongfully discharged him. Plaintiff recovered judgment for the first instalments, and now, after the expiration of the contract period, sues for the remaining instalments. Defendant
pleads the judgment in the first suit as a bar to plaintiff's action. Held, the
judgment on the previous instalments was no bar to the action, the doctrine
of "constructive service" still prevailing in Georgia. Edison v. Dundee
Woolen Mills, (Ga. App. 1917), 93 S. E. 324Whatever view the court may have held concerning the wisdom of allowing a plaintiff thus wrongfully discharged to bring separate actions for the
successive instalments as they should become due, no other disposition was
possible for this case, since it was controlled by the prior decisions of the
Georgia Supreme Court. Moore v. Kelly & Jones Co., III Ga. 371, 36 S. E.
8o2; Bluii v. Holitzer, 53 Ga. 82; Isaacs v. Davies, 68 Ga. 16g. A few other
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jurisdictions are still in accord with these decisions. Fowler v. Armour, 24
Ala. 194; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. St. Rep. 8; Marx v. Miller,
134 Ala. 347, 32 So. 765; Smith v. Lumber Co., 142 N. C. 26; Stradley v.
Bath Portland Cement Co., 228 Pa. St. 108; Allen v. biternational Textbook
Co., 201 Pa. St. 579, 51 Atl. 323. The doctrine of ~'constructive service" had
its origin in a nisi prius decision in England early in the nineteenth century.
Ganden v. Pontigny, 4 Campb. 375. The effect of the doctrine is to allow
a servant, employed for a definite period at a stipulated wage, and wrongfully discharged before the expiration of the term, to bring suit for each instalment as it becomes due, as though the contract were still continuing. This
holding is based on the fiction that the servant is constructively ready to
perform the services, and that when the time comes for the payment of each
instalment there is a partial breach of the contract. The doctrine has been
repudiated in England, Fewings v. Tisdal, 1 Exch. 295; Archard v. Hornor,
3 C. & P. 349, 14 E. C. L. 604; Elderton v. Emmens, 6 C. B. 160, 60 E. C. L.
160, affirmed 13 C. B. 495, 76 E. C. L. 495, 4 H. L. Cas. 624; and in a majority
of the American jurisdictions. James v. Allen Co., 44 Oh. St. 226, 6 N. E.
246, 58 Am. Rep. 821; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285
(though the case did not tum alone on this point); Olmstead v. Bach, 78
Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 22 L. R A. 74, 44 Am. St. R 273; Carmean v. North
Americaii Transportation, etc. Co., 45 Wash. 446, 88 Pac. 834 122 Am. St.
Rep. 930, 13 Ann. Cas. no and note, 8 L. R A. (N. S.) 595. According to
the prevailing view, the servant thus wrongfully discharged cannot, ~ven by
waiting until the expiration of the contract term, bring his action for wages
as such. Instead, his suit is for damages as for the breach of an ordinary
contract, and a judgment in one suit, although covering only a part of the
contract period, will be a bar to further actions. This holding goes on the
theory that there is only one breach, and that a single cause of action should
not be split into several suits. In this one suit, however, whether brought
before or after the expiration of the contract period, the plaintiff may, by
the later authorities, recover full damages for the loss caused by the breach
of the contract. Addis v. Gramophone Co. (1909), A. C. 488, 78 L. J. K B.
u22, IOI L. T. N. S. 466, 3 British Rul. Cas. g8, 16 Ann. Cas. g8, note; Meade
v. Doherty, 7 N. B. 195; Steams v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., u2 Mich. 651, 71
N. W. u8; Cilfter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N. E. 1010; Boland v. Glendale
Quarry Co., 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W. 151; Rhoades v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co.,
49 W. Va. 494. 55 L. RA. 170, 87 Am. St. Rep. 826, 39 S. E. 209; Wilke v.
Harrison Bros., 166 Pa. St. 202, 30 Atl. u25; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641,
53 N. E. 181, 54 N. E. 437, 71 Am. St. Rep. 384 This recovery includes prospective damages for the entire period of the contract, rather than merely
up to the time of the trial, but does not include damages for injured feelings
or reputation or for the manner of the dismissal. Addis v. Gramophone Co.;
supra. But where the stipulated term is for life or during ability to perform
the services the authorities are in confusion as to whether prospective damages are recoverable. Apparently, if the wronged servant in such a case is
to secure redress of any effectiveness at all, he must be given speculative
damages. And who can say how long he will live? It is this injustice in
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the majority holding which the Minnesota court attacks in McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 60 Minn. 156, 62 N. W. 120, 51 Am. St. Rep. 5u, 27 L. R. A. 409·
The latter court, after showing that the fiction of "constructive service" is
properly repudiated as a basis of recovery (because of its inconsis~ency with
the principle that the plaintiff should attempt to mitigate the damages by
searching for another position), argues that the discharged servant simply
desires indemnity, and not damages; that it is impossible to estimate fairly
or accurately the time he would have been able to serve; that there is no
way to fix the amount necessary to indemnify him, until the time has actually
passed, so that the amount earned by other employment, if any, can be deducted; that in the meantime he may have no income upon which to liye;
that the Statute of Limitations probably would force him to bring his action
before the expiration of the term that he would have been able to serve ;
and that he should be allowed to bring successive actions at the close of the
instalment periods. That is, the Minnesota view is to adopt the rule of
"constructive service" as to the measure of damages while rejecting it as the
basis of recovery. Unfortunately, the equitable Minnesota rule has not been
followed elsewhere. See Carmean v. North Americaii Transportation, etc.
Co., supra.
PHYSICIANS AND SuRG£0NS-PRAcrICING WITHOUT LICENsr:-SPIRITUALISM.
-THr: PUBLIC Hr:ALTH LAW prohibited the practice of medicine without a license, excepting by those who practice according to the religious tenets of any
church. A member of the Spiritualist Church had an office in which he received patients and dispensed drugs and liniments prepared by himself. It
appeared that he was ordained as a healer of the church. Held, that defendant was not immune, the exemption giving him no authority to heal by
agencies other than prayer or the practice of religion. People v. Vogelgesang (N. Y. 1917), u6 N. E. 977.
The cases for the most part regard the diagnosis as the test to determine
whether a practice or treatment is included in the term medicine. State v.
Smith, 233 Mo. 242. The exception to the statute in the case of one practicing the religious tenets of any church cannot be used as a shield to a business undertaking, and when the accused claims to act as a "divine healer"
it has been held that it is the nature of defendants business, not the objects
of the tenets of his church that control. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, II7
Pac. 612. In State v. Peters, 87 Kans. 265, 123 Pac. 751, where de.fendant
claimed to practice ·a religious belief but "diagnosed diseases and treated patients in a matter-of-fact way by manipulations and rubbing," he was not
within the exemption of the statute. In the instant cas'e the same applies. "The
sufferer's mind must be brought into submission to the infinite mind, and in
this must be the healing," and, continues the opinion, ''While the healer inculcates the faith of the church as a method of healing he is immune. When
he goes beyond that, puts his spiritual agencies aside, and takes up the agencies
of the flesh, his immunity ceases." The statute is strictly construed ~gainst
the defendant. Commonwealth v. Delon, 219 Mass. 217, Io6 N. E. 846. But
the exemption includes every person in the practice of the religious tenets
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of any church who acts in good faith. People v. Cole, 219 N. Y. 98, 113
N. E;790. It was said in People v. Cole, supra, where the exemption applied
to a person practicing Christian Science healing through prayer, that "healing would seem to be not only the prominent work of the church and its
members, but the one distinctive belief around which the church organization is founded and sustained." It follows from the principal case and the
other authorities cited that a spiritualist could administer his treatments
through the means . of the tenets of his religion in so far as they do not
authorize the use of drugs or extrinsic methods.
PRoPitRTY-UNPATl!NT&> CoNCl!PTS.-Stein sued for an order enjoining;
Morris and others from using a certain plan for conducting the business of
banking and lending money on sectirity, now commonly known as the "Morris
Plan," which he claimed to have originated and to own. The idea was to
lend money, in small amounts, to borrowers who should take out an amount
of stock in the company equal to the amount of their loans. This stock was
to be held by the company as security for the loan and the borrower was
to make periodic payments upon the stock This when fully paid for provided
a means of discharging the loan obligation. Stein alleged that he, as originator, had communicated this plan in detail to Morris who had put it into
profitable use for his own purposes. Held, that the plan used by Morris was
not in fact the same as that admitted to have been suggested to him by
the .plaintiff, and that, furthermore, the plaintiff's scheme was not itself original with him but had long been in operation in that part of Europe from
which he had emigrated. The court said further that even if Stein had
originated the Morris plan, "he could not have a property right in such a
method or idea for conducting business without any physical means or devices for carrying it. out. In other words, he could not put such an id~
into operation without it at once escaping his own grasp and becoming the
property of mankind." Stein v. Morris (Va. 1917), 91 S. E. 177.
·
The case is interesting because of the comparative infrequence of claimsof ownership in an idea, outside of the l;tatutes giving such ownership. . The
quoted dictum of tlie case in regard to such ownership at common law is
quite in accord with precedent. There is undoubtedly property, or, to avoid
question of definition, a right fo rem, at common liw in certain intangible
things, such as reputation and the performance of a contract by the promisor
without malicious interference by a third party. But there is no recognition
of a right in rem concerning particular concepts emanating from individual
brains, with the possible exception of an author's right to literary production.
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 2303; Gayler v. Wilder, IO How. 477, 502. This is
on the ground, apparently, that ownership must be predicated upon the possibility of exclusive possession. "So long as the originator of the naked idea·
keeps it to himself * * * it is his exclusive property, but it ceases to be his
own when he permits it to pass from him. Ideas of this sort in their relation
to property may be likened to the interest which a person may obtain in bees
and birds, and fish in running streams, which are conspicuous instances of
(animals) ferae naturae. If the claimant keeps them on his own premises they
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become his qualified property, and absolutely his so long as they do not escape.
But if he permits them to go he can not follow them." Bristol v. E. L. A.
Society, 52 Hun I6I, 5 N. Y. Supp. I3I, cited in the principal case. To the
same effect are J. G. Wilso1i v. Ro1lsseau, 4 How. 646, 673; Gayler v. Wilder, IO
How. 477; Morton v. N. Y. Eye blfirmary, 5 Blatch. n6; Dudley v. Mayhew,
3 Comstock (N. Y.) 9; Comstock v. White, I8 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 42I. It
was undoubtedly the purpose of the patent statutes to rectify this condition
of the common law and it is quite probable that Stein might have patented
his idea had it been new and· original with him even though it did not require physical devices for carrying it out. For a discussion of this point
see IS Mic:e:. L. R.Ev. 660.
RAU.ROADS-INJURY CAUSED BY F~ TO MuNICIPAI. FrnEMAN.-A public
statute made a railroad liable for damages to person or property from fires
set by its locomotives. Plaintiff, a city fireman, was injured in an attempt to
extinguish a fire on X's property caused by defendant railroad. Held, that
the act did not apply to the fireman, but only to those so situated that as to
them the operation of the road constituted an extra fire hazard, and the railroad company violated no duty owed the fireman. Clark v. Boston & M. R.
R. (N. H. I9I7), IOI Atl. 795.
The statute does not apply in the case of property of a third person in the
railroad's charge, but applies only to property in the control of others along
its line. Welch et al. v. Concord R.R., 68 N. H. 2o6, 44 Atl. 304; Bassett v.
Conn.· River R. Co., I45 Mass. I29. At common law a fireman injured
through defects in the property is not entitled to recover, as he is considered ·
a licensee, and the owner owes him no active duty. Kelly v. Henry Muhs
Co., 7I N. J. L. 358; Gibson v. Leonard, I43 Ill. I82, 32 N. E. 182. The
proprietor must refrain from wilful or affirmative acts which are iniurious.
Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Col. 3I6, no Pac. 203; Woodruff v. Bowen, I36 Ind. 43I, 34 N. E. III3. Where a fireman called to put
out a fire caused by an explosion resulting from defendant's locomotive negligently "kicking'' one of its cars, was injured by subsequent explosions,
it was held that he could recover, such a situation being within the rule
that a licensee has the right to require the proprietor to so conduct himself
as not to injure another through his active negligence, for the subsequent
explosion was a part of 'a series of events set in motion by the original act
of the company. Houston Belt, &c. R. Co. v. O'Leary (Tex. Civ. App. I9II)~
136 S. W. 6o1; Bamett v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 87 N. J. L. 29, 93 Atl.
Io8. The plaintiff could not recover in the instant case for his injury. He
assumed the risk His attempt to extinguish the fire, and not the company's
negligence, was the proximate cause of his injury. Seale v. Gi&lf C. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 274.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT TO DEVISE-HARDSHIP ON INNOCENT
THIRD P ART!Es.-On a promise to the plaintiffs' father that they should succeed to the promisor's property, the plaintiffs, when children, went to live
with him. He was then childless, but thirty years later had a child by a
second wife. To the wife and child, who knew nothing of the agreement~
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he conveyed the bulk of his property upon which the plaintiffs now seek to
impose a constructive trust. Held, that specific performance should be de- nied. Sargent et al. v. Corey et al. (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App., 1917), 166 Pac.
1021.
Owens v. McNally (1896), II3 Cal. 444. 45 Pac. 710, 33 L. R. A. 369,
seems here for the first time to have been followed in its basic principlethe protection of the innocent w'idow of. the defaulting promisor. Stewart
v. Smith (1907), 6 Cal. App. 152, 161, 91 Pac. 667, 671; 2 MICH. L. Rsv.
235. Its doctrine appears even to have been broadened, in spite of the court's
reasoning to the contrary, inasmuch as in the earlier case the court said the
plaintiff had redress in a court of law. Here no such alternative is suggested,
by the court and the nature of the case makes the recovery of any but
nominal damages improbable. Facts giving rise to the same question seem
to be found in only one other case, Dillon v. Gray (1912), 87 Kan. 129, 123
Pac. 878. There Owens v. McNally was treated with respect, as it uniformly is, but the promisor's wife, though innocent, was not protected, because viewing the extraneous circumstances of the case, the judge thought
the enforcement of the contract would not be "inequitable." The difficulty in
finding any valid test for regulating the court's discretion in preventing hardship to third parties is not new, nor are the California decisions unsupportable by dicta. Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun. 600, 19 N. Y. Supp. 332; POMEROY, SPECIFIC. PERFORMANCS OF CONTRACTS (1879), § 181, citing Thomas v. Dering, I
Keen 729; Curran v. Holyoke Water Co., n6 Mass. 90. The plaintiffs' suggestion that the corpus be divided equally between the equally virtuous parties
is refreshing, even though respect for the terms of the original contract forbade its adoption.
TELEGRAPHS AND TuLEPHONES-DUTY TO FURNISH CHANGE.....;....Plaintiff sued
for damages resulting from a delay in the transmission of a message. The
telegraph operator refused to accept the same because he could not change
a five dollar bill tendered him by the plaintiff. Held, that a telegraph company
must be prepared to furnish change to a reasonable amount to a person desiring to send a telegram, the reasonableness with reference to the amount, time,
and place to be judicially determined. Dale v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 740.
The principal case cites no cases directly in point relating to telegraph
companies and diligent search has revealed none; it was, however, thought
that the case was governed by those principles relating to the duties of a
public service corporation, analogous in this respect to a common carrier.
The general rule is that a passenger, particularly one on a street car, is not
bound to tender the exact fare, the courts differing only as to what is a
reasonable sum out of which the company may be required to make change.
!Yfaldowney v. Pittsburg & B. Traction Co., 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 335; Gillespie v.
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 178 N. Y. 347; Wynn v. Georgia R. & Electric Co.,
6 Ga. App. 77; 64 S. E. 278; Funderburg v. Augusta & Aiken Ry. Co., 81
S. C. 141, 61 S. E. 1075; Barrett v. Market St. Ry. Co., 81 Cal. 296, 6 L.
R. A. 336; Barker v. Central Park N. & E. River Co., 151 N. Y. 237, 35
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L. R. A. 489. The true rule is that the status of telegraph companies is
analogous to common carriers in regard to their quasi-public character, and
in their duty to serve the public generally in good faith, impartially, and without discrimination. Central U. Tel. Co. v. Swoveland, I4 Ind. App. 34I, 42 N.
E. Io35; Central U. Tel. Co. v. State, n8 Ind. I94. I9 N. E. 604, Io Am. St.
Rep. n4 It is admitted that public sen•ice corporations owe a duty to furnish
reasonable accommodations to the public. Narrett v. Market St. Ry., supra.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case held that there was no reason
for requiring a telegraph company to furnish change. It was argued that
a passenger on a street railway naturally expects the conductor to have
change, and that it would result in hardship to the passenger were the
carrier not to owe a duty to furnish change. But it is readily seen that
the s;ime arguments apply with even greater force to the case of a party
desiring to send a telegram. Those in charge of a telegraph office have better facilities for keeping money on hand and can more easily procure it if
they find it necessary, than a conductor could while in charge of his car.
One boarding a car has just as much opportunity to get the exact amount
ready as has a person who sends a telegram. Jt seems that because of the
duty as a publil:: service corporation to furnish reasonable accommodations,
a telegraph company ought to be bound to furnish a reasonable amount of
change to those desiring to send a telegram.
ToRTS-INTtRFSSNCt WITH EMPLOYMtNT-RlGH'l' TO STRIKt.-Defendant unions and their members, by agreement, ceased to work with the nonunion men of the plaintiff, the end in view being the strengthening of the
union. Held, that this end was justifiable, there being no indication that
the defendants' real purpose was to injure the plaintiff or the non-union
men employed, such injury being a consequence of trade competition and
an incident to a course of conduct by the defendants begun and prosecuted
for their own legitimate interests. Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' Local Union No. I (Conn. I9I7), IOI Atl.
659.
It now seems well settled that a strike is not wrong per se. Mills v.
U. S. Printing Co. of Olzio, 9I N. Y. Supp. 185, 99 App. Div. 6o5; Grassi
Contracting Co. v. Be1111ett, I6o N. Y. Supp. 279; Wabash R. Co. v. Han11aha11, 121 Fed. 563; Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Michalek (III. l9I7),
n6 N. E. 714; Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick (Mass. I917), n6 N. E.
8o1. The present tendency of the authorities appears to support the statement of the court in the instant case that where a strike is primarily
for the betterment of the condition of the members of the unions it is
justifiable, if not unlawful or opposed to public policy. Nat'l Protective
Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Grassi Contracting Co.
v. Bennett, supra; Davis Mach. Co. v. Robinson, 84 N. Y. Supp. 837, 41
Misc. Rep. 329; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; Cornellier
v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'1i, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643;
Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, supra; State v. Sfockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58
At!. 769; Kemp v. Division No. 24I, Amalgamated Association of Street
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& Blee. Ry. Employees of America, 255 Ill. 2r3, 99 N. E. 389. But the
troublesome question is to determine what is an unlawful strike, and upon
this point the cases are not in harmony. It is generally agreed that a combination contemplating the use of force, threats, or intimidation is unlawful.
Minn. Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, I3I Minn. 458, r55 N. W. 638; State v.
Stockford, supra; Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, supra; P1wvis v. Local No.
500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 2r4 Pa. 348, 63 At!. 585,
u2 Am. St. Rep. 757. Likewise, a strike primarily for injury to others is
unlawful. Grassi Contracting Co. v. Be1111ett, supra; Davis Mach. Co. v.
Robinson, supra. On the other hand, it is held legitimate for a builders'
association to write to an architect that its members will not bid on buildings
if the bid of a certain person is received in competition. Master Builders'
Ass'n v. Domascio, 16 Colo. App. 25, 63 Pac. 782. Several cases indicate that
it is justifiable to strike for the purpose of enforcing a closed shop. Grassi
Contracting Co. v. Bennett, supra; Garside v. Hollywood, ISO N. Y. Supp,
647, 88 Misc. Rep. 3u; Jacobs v. Cohm, r83 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5, 2 L. R A.
(N. S.) 292, III Am. St. R 730, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 280 (VANN, ]., dissenting); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 At!. 230 (approved in Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 18r, 65 At!. 226;
Gray v. Building Trades Council, 9r Minn. lJI, 97 N. W. 663; Kemp v.
Division No. 241, supra (three justices dissenting); Roddy v. United Mine
Wo1·kers of America, 4r Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126, L. R A. r915 D, 789. This
theory is supported on the grounds that the securing of a closed shop is for
the betterment and strengthening of the union, that a combination of individuals may do what one may do where the act is not illegal, and upon a
broad view of the right of labor to combine. The Massachusetts court,
on the contrary, declares (though not in any case turning directly upon this
point), "that a strike instituted merely to compel a closed shop would not
be justifiable on principles of competition, but would be unlawful." Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'n, supra; Plant v. Woods, r76
Mass. 492, 57 N. E. IOII; Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294. 84 N. E. 457;
Snow Iron Wor.ks v. Chadwick, supra (semble). But that court has held
lawful a strike to force au employer to employ union men for all of the
work upon a particular building, Pic.kett v. Walsh, supra,-a holding that is
hard to.distinguish in ultimate effect from that of permitting a strike to enforce a closed shop. The position of the Connecticut court is somewhat
doubtful as to the legality of a strike to enforce a closed shop. The opinion
in Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 64r, 86 At!. 600, indicates a stand against
the forcing of a closed shop. The instant case is not necessarily a decision in favor of the opposite view, inasmuch as more than one-third of the
men in the locality of the strike in all trades were non-union men, and, in
the mind of the court, were a sufficiently large proportion to prevent the defendant unions from exercising compulsion upon the employer.

ToR'rs-N:EGI.IG:ENCE OF V:ENOOR_:_Plaintiff entered defendant's eating place,
ordered a pfoce of cake, which had been baked and prepared by the defendant, and, while eating same, bit upon a metallic nail concealed therein.
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In an action of tort for damages suffered, held, defendant was not liable.
Jacobs v. Childs Co. (1917), 166 N. Y. Supp. 798. '
As was said by the court in the principal case, an examination of the authorities does not reveal any case involving the precise point contained above,
but an examination of the facts and decision in the instant case would seem
to indicate that the court overlooked a vital point, in reaching its conclusion.
As authority for its decision, the court cites the case of Hasbrouck v. Armoflr
& Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157; but the question involved in the instant case was not present in the Wisconsin case at all. In the latter case,
plaintiff, while washing her hands, was injured by a needle imbedded in the
cake of toilet soap she was using, which soap she had purchased from a
retail dealer, who had in tum purchased it from Armour & Co., manufacturer of the soap, from whom plaintiff sought damages. The court there
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover from Armour & Co., on
the ground of negligence, because there was no such privity between the
parties as to give rise to any duty owed to plaintiff by the defendant, of
which there had been a breach. In the principal case, however, there was a
privity between the parties,-a privity of contract. The article sold to the
plaintiff by the defendant was one which the latter had made itself, and the
court seems to have overlooked that fact in its application of the doctrine
of remoteness. It is true that the rule has been laid down that the vendor
of an article not inherently dangerous in character is not liable to one, not
a party to the contract of sale, who is injured because of defects in the
dangerous construction of the article. See Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co.,
87 Fed. 109, 30 U. S. C. C. A. 567; Salmon v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, u4
Ill. App. 258; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 57 U.
S. C. C. A. 237. That was the rule followed, and no doubt rightly followed,
in the Armour case; but the presence of a privity of contract between the
parties in the principal case would seem to give rise to a different question;
viz., whether, due to the privity of contract between the parties, a duty was
not created which was violated, and the breach of which gzve rise to a cause
of action in tort. That question seems to have been entirely overlooked.
WILLS-IRRJo.'VOCABLE.-A bill in chancery prayed that probate of a will be
revoked and a later will admitted to probate. Held, on demurrer, that the
suit should be dismissed on the ground that by probating the will the testator
had renounced the right to make a later will, the probated will being in these
words : "I do hereby bargain, sell and convey to my said husband all the
property I now own or may acquire prior to my death, and agree that this
is to take effect only in case of my death prior to that of my husband." Walker
v. Yarbrough (Ala- 1917), 76 So. 390.
In justification of this decision the court says in part: "It is therefore
clear from these authorities that one may, for a valuable consideration paid to
him, renounce his absolute power to dispose of his estate at pleasure. * * *
But it must be conceded that the former instrument was binding in its contractual feature, and that therefore the respondent should be entitled to relief by way of cross-bill, and the contractual feature of the instrument en-
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forced by the establishment of a trust upon all the property owned by the
testatrix at the time of her death. * * * The result therefore, would be that
the court would sustain the contention of the complainants to set aside the
will in favor of the respondent Walker, and in the same decree enforce the
will by way of establishing a trust in favor of said Walker, upon the entire
estate owned by her at the time of her death. We respectfully submit that
this would be an anomalous situation in judicial procedure." McCLELLAN,
J., dissented from the decision on the ground that the instrument was on
its face merely contractual, and. under no circumstances entitled to probate.
The first contention of the majority of the court that a man can for a
valuable consideration renounce his power to make a will, is believed to
be .absolutely unsupportable by authority. The right to alienate is an inseparable incident of ownership. This doctrine has not been seriously disputed since Mildmay's Case (I6o5), 6 Coke 40. The cases are reviewed in a
note in i4 MICH. L. REV. (Feb., I9I6), p. 353. It is believed there is no case
sustaining the contention that a person can by contract deprive himself of
his legal right to make a will; but he certainly can by contract dispose of
his property, both that then owned, and by way of estoppel that later to be
acquired; so that when he later makes a will there will be no property for
it to operate on. However, the question as to whether there is any property
to pass by the will, what or how much, is not a question as to the validity of
the probate. The peculi~rity of the instant case is that the contract made
by the deceased, which contains no suggestion of the testamentary intention,
had been admitted to probate as a will; and when the proponent of the
later will sought to have that probate annulled, it was manifest to the court
that to grant his prayer would secure him nothing and only lead to. useless
litigation. , The decision seems entirely fostifiable on the ground that the
court will not do a vain thing.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT-"PERSONAL INJURy''-OccuPATIONAL
DISEASES.-X, an employee in a cigar factory, was incapacitated through
neurosis which resulted from a bending "with shoulders forward,' so as to
induce "pressure on the brachia! plexus," after being so employed twentyfive years. The lower court granted compensation under the WORKMAN'S
COMPENSATION ACT (St. 19II, c 75I, Mass.), and the insurer appealed. Held,
that a disease which arises within the course of employment with nothing
more is not within the ACT. fore Maggelet (Mass. I917), n6 N. E. 972.
While the question decided in this case follows the rule laid down by
the courts generally, it is of interest in showing the limitation which the
Massachusetts court has placed upon its earlier decisions holding that certain occupational diseases were personal injuries within the meaning of the
WoRKMAN's COMPENSATION ACT. See 14 MICH. L. REv. 525. In the principal case the court says, "The words 'personal injury' in their connection
in this statute do not naturally lend themselves to a situation such as that
here disclosed. The ACT relates to industrial conditions * * * The Ac:r
does not mention disease or occupational disease." In Hurle's Case, 2I7
Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, the same judge speaking for the court, said, "It
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is significant that the element of accident was not intended to be imported
into our Acc:r," and compensation was allowed a workman who had gradually become blind through the effects of poisonous gas on the optic nerve.
In Madam's Case, 222 Mass. 487, III N. E. 379, recovery under the Acc:r
was allowed a woman who, through the exertion and strain of her employment, had so aggravated a pre-existing heart disease as to disable her, the
court saying, "It was a definite and specific detriment to the physiological
structure of her body." In Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735,
recovery was had for an injury due to lead poisoning which had occurred
gradually during the employee's occupation. In holding as it did the principal case is neither illogical nor inconsistent, but merely limits the docttjne
of the earlier cases.

